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NOTE
Do You Feel the Sunshine?
Government in the Sunshine Act:
Its Objectives, Goals, and
Effect on the FCC and You
Kathy Bradley*
Government is and should be the servant of the people, and it should
be fully accountable to them for the actions which it supposedly takes
on their behalf.'
INTRODUCTION ................................... 474
I. THE GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT .............. 475
A. The Purpose Behind the Act .................. 475
B. Open Meetings ............................ 476
C. Closing Meetings .......................... 477
1. Requirements to Close Meetings ............. 477
2. Requirements Subsequent to the Closed Meeting 478
D. Remedies Available ......................... 478
]1[. LITIGATION INVOLVING THE FCC .................. 480
II. COSTS OF THE ACT ............................ 481
A. Decrease in Collegiality ..................... 482
B. Staffing Decisions ......................... 483
C. Notation Voting ........................... 483
D. Potentially Useful Meetings Not Being Held ....... 484
E. Control by the Chairman .................... 484
* B.S. Indiana University-Bloomington; candidate for J.D. Indiana University School
of Law-Bloomington, 1997.
1. H.R. REP. No. 94-880, pt. I, at 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183,
2184.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
IV. SUGGESTED REFORMS ............................ 485
A. Recent Hearings ........................... 485
B. Exemption Under FOA ..................... 486
V. BENEFITS OF NARROWING THE ACT ................. 487
CONCLUSION ....................................... 489
INTRODUCTION
"Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial
disease. Sunlight is said to be the best disinfectant and electric light the
most efficient policeman."2 Justice Brandeis' words, so often quoted in
reference to the Government in the Sunshine Act (Sunshine Act or the Act),
identify the goals set forth by Congress in implementing the Act. The
Sunshine Act provides for open meetings of government agencies and the
prohibition of exparte communications by agency personnel in connection
with adjudicatory hearings? The policy behind the Act is to allow the
public as much access to information regarding the decisionmaking
processes of the federal government as is practicable, or in other words, the
"government should conduct the public's business in public."4 While the
primary purpose of the Act is to provide the public with information, this
right must be balanced with the protection of individual privacy rights, and
should allow the government the ability to continue to carry out its
responsibilities efficiently.5
Based on one source, the severity of the changes mandated, at least as
related to core administrative processes of numerous agencies, ranks the Act
"among the most sweeping enactments in the history of the Federal
administrative establishment." 6 Now in its twentieth year, the Sunshine Act
has not come without significant costs. This Note discusses how those costs,
such as a decrease in collegial decisionmaking, staff level decisions, and
increased notation voting, outweigh the benefits of the Act in fostering
public understanding. Since the Act does reduce significantly the temptation
by agencies to make decisions in complete secrecy and without explanation,
this Note argues only that the Act be narrowed to allow the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or the Commission) and other agencies
2. Louis BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 67 (1933).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1994).
4. S. REP. No. 94-354, at 1 (1975).
5. Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 2, 90 Stat. 1241 (codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1994)).
6. David M. Welbom et al., Implementation and Effects of the Federal Government in
the Sunshine Act in 1984 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, at 199, 201 (Administrative
Conference of the United States: Background Report for Recommendation 84-3).
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to operate in the same ways as Congress and Federal courts, through open
and frank discussion of issues. This Note argues that by narrowing the Act
to allow for predecisional debate among agency commissioners, public
welfare is heightened because the FCC, as well as other agencies, will make
better informed decisions.
I. TH GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT
A. Purposes Behind the Act
The Sunshine Act, passed in 1976, came in an era when disillusion
and distrust of government was high. Vietnam had just come to an end and
Watergate was fresh in the minds of the American public. By 1972, almost
two-thirds of Americans believed that those in government were acting in
their own self-interest rather than acting in the best interest of the country.7
The public was not aware of many government activities and much of the
information received by the public was information selected for public
announcement by the government.3
In response to the disillusion and dissatisfaction with government,
Congress began to expand open government first with the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) and the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA),
then by passing new laws including the Sunshine Act. At the time of the
enactment of the Sunshine Act, open-records-and-meeting laws existed in
most of the states.9 The open-meetings requirement of the Act, discussed
infra Part I.B., was designed to allow the public to view firsthand the
government process thereby increasing "public understanding of administra-
tive decisionmaking processes."'0 In theory, "people are able to gain a
better understanding of the thought process behind government actions and
to ensure that their concerns have been considered" through this public
viewing."
7. 133 CONG. REC. 5177 (1987) (statement of Senator Lawton Chiles, author of the
sunshine legislation, on the tenth anniversary of the Sunshine Act). Senator Chiles further
stated in his address that "there is no commonsense reason why citizens shouldn't be able
to watch how Government spends their money and reaches decisions affecting their
businesses, their communities and their future. Citizens cannot hold Government officials
accountable if they don't know what those officials are doing." Id.
8. Id.
9. Welborn et al., supra note 6, at 202.
10. H.R. REP. No. 94-880, pt. I, at 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183,2184
(citing testimony of Glen 0. Robinson, a former FCC Commissioner, in a hearing before the
Government Information and Individual Rights Subcommittee).
11. 133 CONG. REc. 5177 (1987).
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B. Open Meetings
The Act requires every portion of every meeting of an agency,
including the FCC, to be open to public observation. 2 A "meeting" is
defined as deliberations which include the number of individuals required
to make decisions on behalf of an agency, and result in disposition of
agency business. 3 Members of agencies are not allowed to conduct agency
business unless it is in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C.
§ 552b. 4 If the commission members hold a meeting, the agency must
make a public announcement of the time, place, and subject matter of the
meeting, as well as whether the meeting is to be open or closed, at least one
week prior to the meeting.'5 In essence, this means that the five commis-
sioners of the FCC may not discuss agency business when three or more
commissioners are in each other's presence. For instance, if two commis-
sioners are speaking about an issue which will be addressed by the FCC in
the near future and a third commissioner joins the conversation, the three
commissioners violate the Act.' 6 The commissioners may only discuss the
matter with each other after giving public notice of the meeting.'7
12. 5 U.S.C. § 552b states:
(a) For purposes of this section--
(I) the term "agency" means any agency, as defined in section 552(e) of this
title, headed by a collegial body composed of two or more individual
members... and any subdivision there-of authorized to act on behalf of the
agency;(2) the term "meeting" means the deliberations of at least the number of
individual agency members required to take action on behalf of the agency
where such deliberations determine or result in joint conduct or disposition
of official agency business....
(3) the term "member" means an individual who belongs to a collegial body
heading an agency.
(b) Members shall not jointly conduct or dispose of agency business other than in
accordance with this section... every portion of every meeting of an agency shall
be open to public observation.
Id.
The FCC clearly falls within the definition of an agency in this Act, and thus
members/commissioners are required to hold open meetings unless they determine that one
of the exemptions applies.
13. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(2).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(2).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(e)(1).
16. KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINIsTRAnvE LAW TREATISE
§ 5.18, at 219 (3d ed. 1994).
17. Id. § 5.18, at 220. Professor Davis further posits that the Government in the
Sunshine Act "renders collegiality impossible in a collegial body that heads an agency." Id.
This argument will be revisited in a later discussion of the effects of the Act.
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C. Closing Meetings
There are ten exceptions or exemptions whereby meetings may be
closed. 8 However, the standard for closing a meeting is a strict one. "In
case of doubt as to whether a portion of a meeting is exempt, the presump-
tion is to be in favor of openness[,] ... [e]ven if a matter falls within an
exemption... ."" If the public interest requires that the meeting be open,
then it must be open.2 Any person is allowed to challenge the closing of
a meeting through court proceedings, and the burden of proving that the
closing is valid rests with the agency.
21
1. Requirements to Close Meetings
If the commissioners of an agency choose to close a meeting,
believing the contents of the meeting fall within one of the exemptions, a
majority of the commissioners must vote to do so? The vote of each
commissioner must be recorded and made available within one day of the
vote,' so the general public will be aware of a commissioner's stance on
openness.24 In addition, if a portion of a meeting is to be closed, the
agency must make available a full written explanation of its actions in
closing the meeting! This explanation should contain under which
exemption the closing falls, as well as the factors used in the determination
18. These exceptions pertain to:
(1) national defense and foreign policy;
(2) personnel rules and practice;
(3) information explicitly protected from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and privileged or confidential commercial information;
(5) accusations of criminal conduct or the formal censure of an individual;
(6) information of a personal nature the disclosure of which would be an invasion
of privacy;
(7) investigatory records used in enforcement;
(8) information generated in the regulation of financial institutions;
(9) material the premature disclosure of which would produce financial speculation
or threaten the stability of a financial institution, and that which would "be likely
to significantly frustrate implementation of a proposed agency action";
(10) issuance of subpoenas, participation in civil, international or foreign actions
or proceedings, and dispositions of adjudicatory matters.
Welborn et al., supra note 6, at 201.
19. H.L REP. No. 94-880, pt. I, at 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183,
2185.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 3-4.
22. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(d)(1), states that action to close a meeting "shall be taken only
when a majority of the entire membership of the agency.., votes to take such action."
23. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(d)(3).
24. H.R. REP. No. 94-880, pt. I, at 13.
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(d)(3).
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to close the meeting, and how the discussion falls within the exemption.26
The explanation "should in every instance be as detailed as possible without
revealing the exempt information." '27
2. Requirements Subsequent to the Closed Meeting
The agency must maintain a complete transcript or electronic recording
of each closed meeting, to be made available to the public after the
meeting. 8 The transcript or recording must include the discussion of all
items on the agenda, as well as the identity and testimony of any person
testifying at the meeting, excluding only those items that are covered under
the exemptions.29 In place of deleted material, the agency must give a
written explanation of the reason for the deletion and the section of the
statute that allows the deletion."
These transcripts are to be made available to the public at the cost of
duplication and, if the public interest so requires, the transcripts must be
made available at no charge." Furthermore, the agency must keep a
complete, verbatim copy of the transcript or recording for at least two years
after the meeting or until one year after the conclusion of any agency
proceeding addressed in the meeting.32 At the time of the enactment of the
Sunshine Act, it was assumed that once a closed meeting was held, most or
all of it would turn out to be nonexempt, and the transcript would be made
available in lieu of attending the meeting.
33
D. Remedies Available
Any person who believes an agency is in violation of the Sunshine Act
may bring action against that agency in federal court.34 However, the
action must be brought within sixty days after the meeting in which the
alleged violation took place, and must be brought in the District of
Columbia, in the district where the agency has its headquarters, or in the
district where the meeting was held.35
26. H.R. REP. No. 94-880 at 13-14.
27. Id.
28. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(f)(2).
29. Id.
30. H.R. REP. No. 880, at 15.
31. Id.
32. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(f)(2).
33. H.R. REP. No. 880, at 15.
34. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(h)(1).
35. Id. This is different than the original draft of the proposed bill. In the original bill,
an action could be brought in any United States district court, allowing the plaintiff to bring
an action where she resides or where she has her principal place of business. Concern was
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There are few remedies available for someone alleging a violation of
the Act. The district court may enjoin the agency from committing similar
violations in the future, or may release portions of the transcript of the
meeting that were not authorized to be withheld.36 A federal court having
jurisdiction only on the basis of the Sunshine Act may not "set aside,
enjoin, or invalidate any agency action (other than an action to close a
meeting or to withhold information under this section) taken or discussed
at any agency meeting out of which the violation of this section arose."
37
In essence, the only real remedy available to plaintiffs is finding out what
happened at the meeting.38
In addition, the court may assess reasonable attorney fees and other
litigation costs against any party who substantially prevails in an action, but
fees may only be assessed against the plaintiff when the court determines
that the action brought was primarily for frivolous or dilatory purposes.
39
In assessing costs against an agency, the costs may be assessed against the
United States.40
When one considers the remedies available to plaintiffs, it is easy to
see why many individuals would not bring an action against an agency. It
would be costly and the only real benefit available to plaintiffs will be
viewing the information from the meeting. It is hard to imagine a situation
in which an ordinary citizen would be so interested in the business of the
FCC or any other agency that he or she would incur such substantial costs,
not to mention that the suit would most likely have to be brought in
voiced about this by House members, fearing that it would "lead to duplicative lawsuits
spread across the country covering the same agency meeting or meetings." H.R. REP. No.
94-880, pt. I, at 17 (citing views of Representative Frank Horton).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(h)(1).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(h)(2). A federal court may provide these remedies if it is a court
that is otherwise allowed by law to review agency action. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized this in a decision where the plaintiff claimed it was harmed by a closed meeting
because it might have sought an emergency stay of an order issued by the defendant. The
court noted that "'release of transcripts, not invalidation of the agency's substantive action,'
is the remedy generally appropriate for disregard of the Sunshine Act." Braniff Master
Executive Council of the Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'I v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 693 F.2d 220,
226 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting Pan Am World Airways v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 684 F.2d
31, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
38. H.R. REP. No. 94-880, pt. I, at 17. The House Report specifically states that "since
a judicial determination that a meeting was unlawfully closed will in most instances come
long after the meeting has been held, and since the substantive action taken at the meeting
cannot be nullified when the court is acting solely under this subsection, the possibility of
finding out what transpired at the meeting represents the only realistic remedy available to
a plaintiff." Id.
39. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(i).
40. Id.
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Washington, D.C., since few, if any, meetings are held outside the FCC's
headquarters. In fact, few have brought suit against the FCC.
II. LITIGATIoN INVOLVING THE FCC
The FCC has not often been required to defend its actions in closing
a meeting. In the landmark case of FCC v. 1T" World Communications,
Inc.,41 the Supreme Court for the first time considered an issue relating to
the Sunshine Act. ITT, a telecommunications carrier, brought suit alleging
that the FCC's negotiations with foreign officials, through the telecommuni-
cations committee of the FCC, were in violation of the Sunshine Act.
According to the court record, at the time of the negotiations, ITT and
another American corporation were the only corporations providing overseas
record telecommunications and were opposed to the entry of new competi-
tors. The Court held that these negotiations were "consultative process
sessions," and that "[s]uch deliberations lawfully could not 'determine or
result in the joint conduct or disposition of official agency business' within
the meaning of the Act."'42
In other cases, the FCC was challenged for closing a meeting based
on exemption ten,43 for using notation voting to dispose of agency
business,' and for not complying with the Sunshine Act's notice
requirement for meetings.45 The courts decided in favor of the FCC in all
of these cases. The most negative decision against the FCC involved the
court striking down the FCC's stricter standard concerning the definition of
"meeting."4 6 The fact that the FCC in the past has faced few challenges
suggests that the FCC has been very open in making decisions, and further
41. 1T7, 466 U.S. 463 (1984).
42. Id. at 473 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(2) (1984)).
43. Shurberg Brdcst. of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 617 F. Supp. 825, 827 (D.D.C. 1985)
(Plaintiff, at the time of the closed meeting, was involved in an outside action against the
FCC requesting a writ of mandamus. The FCC closed the meeting on the basis of pending
adjudication.)
44. Communications Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 797, 798-99 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Communications petitioned for review of an FCC decision not to allow it to convert their
FM radio station from a Class B to a Class C station. Communications argued that the
FCC's deliberations on its request be held in public. The FCC made their decision based on
notation voting. The court held that the Sunshine Act does not require the FCC to hold
meetings before issuing orders to deny a request such as Communications'. Id. at 798.
45. Washington Ass'n for Television and Children (WATCH) v. FCC, 665 F.2d 1264,
1267 (D.C. Cir. 1981) WATCH challenged the notice given by the FCC in regard to an open
meeting to decide whether to call a meeting with shorter notice. The court held in favor of
the FCC, but struck down the FCC's definition of "meeting" in its own regulations, as being
more inclusive than the one contained in the Sunshine Act, and thus in excess of the
Commission's rulemaking authority. Id. at 1272-73.
46. Id.
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suggests that the Act has beneficial effects. However, the larger question is
whether the broadness of the Act and its resulting benefits, outweigh the
substantial costs to the decisionmaking process.
III. COSTS OF THE ACT
When the Sunshine Act was adopted, the Act's proponents determined
that added costs would be minimal. For instance, the House Committee on
Government Operations estimated that the extra cost to agencies would be
minor, and saw most of the costs coming through administrative and clerical
expenses. The committee assumed that most agency meetings would be
open to the public and would therefore not require transcripts or electronic
recordings.47 A 1984 report showed that the monetary costs of the Act
were, in fact, slight.48 Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that
administrative costs have not increased tremendously over subsequent years.
However, there are larger costs, not just monetary in nature, that are
drawbacks which must be seriously considered when determining whether
the Act achieves its original purpose without serious detrimental effects.
From the agency perspective, increased costs were not viewed as coming
in monetary terms, but in terms of greater costs to effectiveness and sound
decision making.49 In reality, costs have come in the form of decreased
collegial decisionmaking, policy being determined by the staffs of
commissioners, as well as trial runs by the commissioners' staffs for formal
open meetings."0 Furthermore, there is more use of notation voting,5 as
47. H.R. REP. No. 94-880, pt. I, at 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183,
2187.
48. See Welbom et al., supra note 6, at 220. Agency officials, at the time of
implementation of the Act, pointed out four areas where they saw loss in administrative
efficiency and delay which they thought did not lead to substantial benefit. These included
the provision for a majority vote to delete or amend an agenda item, the full written
explanation of reasons for closing a meeting, the required list of persons expected to attend
a closed meeting, and for a presiding officer's statement concerning the time and place of
the meeting. However, the Welbom study found that there were few serious administrative
difficulties and that the Act is part of agency life, and "in the narrow administrative sense
it functions smoothly." Id.
49. Id. at 204.
50. Marshall J. Breger, Sunshine Act: Decade of Exposure Leaves Wrinkles, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 25, 1986, at 30.
51. Notation voting is a process in which each commissioner receives his own copy of
a proposed agenda item. The commissioner then reads over each item and checks off
whether he wishes to have a discussion on the matter, by way of a meeting, or he will enter
a vote to approve or disapprove an item. When he has finished looking over the items, the
list is sent to the Minutes Branch, where the results are determined. If any commissioner has
requested discussion on any item, then it will be placed on the meeting agenda. If there is
no request for discussion on an item, the votes are tabulated and the item is considered
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well as fewer potentially useful discussions being held, and more concentra-
tion of power in the hands of the chairman.
A. Decrease In Collegiality
The biggest problem most see with the Sunshine Act is that it
decreases collegiality in the decisionmaking process. Collegial decision-
making is based on the view that those who head an agency will be open
and frank in debating their conflicting views.5 2 However, many commis-
sioners are unwilling to put forth views in an open forum for fear that they
may seem uncertain or uninformed about their decisions. 3 Because of
their fear that they will expose their ignorance or uncertainty on an issue,
commissioners "disguise their uncertainty with stilted and contrived
discussions that greatly impede the kind of frank exchange of views that is
essential to high quality decisionmaking by a collegial body."' 4 The reason
that agencies have a number of commissioners is that the interchange of
differing ideas about public policy issues among the commissioners will
lead to "a collective maturing judgment," which in turn will lead to the best
result.5 The implementation study completed seven years after the
adoption of the Act found that there was a shift in decisionmaking away
approved or disapproved. Communications Sys. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 797,798 (D.C. Cir. 1978)(citing FCC Br. at 26-27).
52. The Hoover Commission's Committee on Independent Regulatory Commissions
concluded, before the Sunshine Act was enacted, that decisions are improved as a result of
interactions among a group of peers, and stated:
A distinctive attribute of commission action is that it requires concurrence by
a majority of members of equal standing after full discussion and deliberation. At
its best each decision reflects the combined judgment of the group after critical
analysis of the relevant facts and divergent views. This provides both a barrier to
arbitrary or capricious action and a course of decisions based on different points
of view and experience.
This process has definite advantages where the problems are complex... and
where the range of choice is wide. A single official can consult his staff but does
not have to convince others to make his views or conclusions prevail. The member
of the commission must expose his reasons and judgments to the critical scrutiny
of his fellow members and must persuade them to his point of view. He must
analyze and understand the views of his colleagues if only to refute.
Welborn et al., supra note 6, at 235 (quoting COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON REGULATORY COMMIS-
SIONS app. N at 21 (1949).
53. Breger, supra note 49.
54. DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 16, § 5.18, at 221.
55. Mr. Friedman also stated that it is impossible for the kind of discussion needed to
take place on policy issues to be done in a public forum, which leads to a deterioration in
the decision-making process. Capital Markets Deregulation and Liberalization Act of 1995:
Hearings on H.R. 2131 before the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 237 (1995)
(statement of Stephen J. Friedman).
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from collegial processes and toward segmented individual processes.56 The
study found various explanations for this; including increased notation
voting and a resulting decline in the importance of meetings in making
decisions, and a sense that collegial bodies are impaired in the performance
of the agency leadership responsibilities placed on them by the statute.
57
Since a commissioner may not discuss or debate with all of her colleagues,
she will often turn to discussions with staff members.
B. Staffing Decisions
Under the Act, the staffs or assistants to commissioners are not
considered to be a "collegial body" and therefore are allowed to meet and
discuss agency business freely. s Meetings of staff members began taking
place with more frequency after the Sunshine Act was adopted5 9 These
meetings theoretically allow a commissioner to gauge the views of other
commissioners before an open meeting, but since a commissioner gains
much of his knowledge through secondary discussions with staff members
after their consultation with the staff members of other commissioners,
decisionmaking and, ultimately, policymaking take place at a lower level,
creating a breakdown in the communication lines among commissioners.60
Furthermore, a staff member feels obligated to reflect the views held by his
or her commissioner and is often not willing to change that view based
upon the views of other members' staffs.6' There is more flexibility in
changing a commissioner's mind when all commissioners are present in an
open debate.62 Members are chosen because of their expertise and the
Sunshine Act cannot facilitate the public interest when decisions are made
by commissioners based on staff information.
C. Notation Voting
Many decisions are made by commissioners through notation voting
without deliberation or discussion. Notation voting is sometimes used to
dispose of matters which are of slight significance and which would require
56. Welborn et al., supra note 6, at 236.
57. Id.
58. H.R. REP. No. 94-880, pt. I, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183,
2189.
59. Meetings of staff members were not unheard of before the Sunshine Act, but the
Welbom study found that they were much more common after the Act. The study also noted
that these meetings were much more likely to take place before the scheduled open
meetings. Welborn et al., supra note 6, at 223.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 239
62. Id.
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too much time on the meeting agenda. 3 However, notation voting is also
used to avoid discussing matters in open meetings.'
The use of notation voting was upheld in Communications Systems,
Inc. v. FCC.5 The court held that the FCC's use of notation voting was
proper, and stated that "[n]otation voting enables Government agencies to
expedite consideration of less controversial cases without formal meetings.
... If all agency actions required meetings, then the entire administrative
process would be slowed-perhaps to a standstill."6 6 The use of notation
voting is yet another sign that the collegial process has broken down to a
great extent under the Act.
D. Potentially Useful Meetings Not Being Held
Another problem under the Act is avoiding useful discussion. There
is some indication that useful discussions may be avoided because those not
subject to the Act are reluctant to discuss matters in a public forum.
Additionally, there is some evidence to suggest that those not subject to the
Act are reluctant to engage in closed meetings when classified or sensitive
material is involved. 7
In ITT, discussed supra Part II, the court held that meetings between
the telecommunications committee and foreign governments were not
"meetings" within the definition of the Act.6 8 In deciding this case, the
Supreme Court may have been aware of the potential problems the FCC
would face during negotiations with foreign governments if it was required
to disclose the negotiations to the public.
E. Control By the Chairman
Since the chairman is not allowed to confer with all of his colleagues,
he will generally turn to his staff, as previously discussed. This creates a
potential problem that the public may get a picture of the agency through
the chairman's eyes only. The temptation to confer only with his staff is
especially strong when the chairman is under time pressure, which is
generally the case when the chairman is asked to speak before congressional
committees.69 It would be difficult for the chairman to circulate his
testimony to all of the commissioners one-by-one, take their individual
63. Id. at 236.
64. Id.
65. Communications Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 797 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
66. Id. at 800-01.
67. Welbom et al., supra note 6, at 233.
68. FCC v. ITT World Comm., Inc., 466 U.S. 463 (1984).
69. A.A. Sommer, Jr., A Commissioner's Anger, INSIGHTS, Nov. 1991, at 4.
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suggestions into account, then recirculate the testimony again prior to the
hearing.70 The chairman is often expected to testify before Congress, and
without the potentially differing views of the other commissioners, the
public gains a view of the Commission based upon only one member. This
certainly does not help the public gain a better understanding of how the
Commission makes decisions.
IV. SUGGESTED REFORMS
A. Recent Hearings
The Sunshine Act has generated some controversy since its enactment,
but has recently been in the news as a result of hearings held on the Act.
One of the most fervent supporters of reform to the Act is Commissioner
Steven M.H. Wallman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
In a September 1995 hearing before a special committee of the Administra-
tive Conference of the United States (an independent, nonpartisan group
dedicated to reforming federal administrative processes), Commissioner
Wallmann stated that he was "an ardent supporter of the act's main goal:
enhancing public understanding of agency decision-making through open
deliberations.: However, he added that, except in rare instances, open
meetings are "short, scripted and perfunctory events involving no delibera-
tion among agency officials."72 At the time of the hearings, Wallmann was
in a different situation than the FCC commissioners: Because of delays
within the executive branch, the SEC, which is supposed to have five
commissioners, had only two.
Although the FCC now has five commissioners, it is not impossible
for the situation that occurred at the SEC to become a reality at the FCC.
When and if this happens, the collegial process suffers even more of a
breakdown. Another administrator speaking at the hearing, Chairman Stuart
E. Weisberg of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,
testified that, at his agency, a quorum consists of two members.7 Because
of this small quorum, "commission members historically have been very
reluctant to talk to any other member outside of agenda meetings, lest those
seeing two members together might think they were violating the act."74
70. Id.
71. Commissioner Wallman along with former and current commissioners of federal
agencies requested these hearings before the subcommittee. Marcia Coyle, Agencies Askfor
Less Sunshine, 18 NAT. L.J., Sept. 25, 1995, at A12.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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This is essentially what happened at the SEC; since there were only two
commissioners, they were unable to communicate with each other on
agency matters without violating the Act and were forced to communicate
through their staffs."
According to Alan C. Campbell, former president of the Federal
Communications Bar Association, a relaxation of the definition of
"meeting" within the Act would improve the decisionmaking process.76
Along these lines, this Note argues that the Sunshine Act should follow in
the footsteps of the FOIA, and allow predecisional deliberations to occur
among commissioners, without the need for public viewing.
B. Exemption under FOA
In order to allow for frank and open debate, FOIA, under exemption
five which pertains to interagency and intra-agency memoranda, allows
protection from public view those communications made in the predeci-
sional deliberations." FOIA requires every agency to publish agency rules,
procedures, and organizational materials in the Federal Register.78
However, the agencies are not required to publish information which falls
under one of the exemptions in 5 U.S.C. § 552b. The fifth exemption in
FOIA pertains to inter- or intra-agency memoranda or letters that are not be
available to anyone outside the agency. However, if another agency is
involved in litigation with the agency that prepared the memoranda or
letters, the memoranda or letters may be available to that agency.79 The
purpose of the exemption was to avoid premature disclosure of agency
transactions, and to allow frank and open debate of views within the agency
in order to better allow formulation of policies and procedures."0 Accord-
ing to the legislative history, the exemption was intended to exempt
disclosure of information when necessary, yet at the same time not permit
complete administrative secrecy.81 By adopting an exemption in the spirit
of FOIA that would allow predecisional debate, members of the FCC would
be able to engage in open deliberations, such as those in which they
engaged prior to the adoption of the Sunshine Act.
75. Commissioner Wallman stated that because of the Act, commissioners deal through
aides and written memos, which he refers to as a "bureaucratic and time-consuming process"
that does not lead to effective decisionmaking. See DON'THIDE/Government Secrecy Keeps
Ducking Its Ugly Head, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 14, 1995, at 32.
76. Coyle, supra note 70.
77. DAvis & PiERCE, supra note 16, § 5.18, at 221.
78. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1994).
79. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1994).
80. 2 ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW, supra note 6, § 10.06[1] at 10-92 (1996).
81. Id. at 10-93 n.2.
ol. 49
GO VERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT
According to A.A. Sommer, who served as a commissioner of the SEC
prior to the Sunshine Act, gatherings around the chairman's table were
common, and allowed for discussion with "utmost candor" issues confront-
ing the Commission.8 However, Sommer stated that this type of candor
is impossible "in the presence of the press, the public, and members of the
staff uninvolved in the matter under discussion." 3 Decisionmaking through
open debate is what best serves the public interest. For those affected by the
decisions of the FCC, which includes most of the public in cases like the
recent debate on children's television, the best solutions arise from informed
decisionmaking, which is the purpose behind multimember agencies.
According to the Welborn study, the underlying problem appears to
be "that policy and strategic planning and the provision of meaningful
direction to the staff commonly require the speculative exploration of
sensitive matters at an early stage if there are to be productive results.""
This is difficult because there are uncertainties as to the dimensions of the
problems, the views of staff and other members, and available options. In
addition, when the public reacts adversely to tentative "strategic thinking,"
this makes it even more difficult.8 Therefore, "collective discussions of
important matters often do not take place, or they come so late in the
process that the positive effects of free collegial interaction are substantially
forfeited."8 6 Allowing an exemption such as the one under FOIA would
encourage the FCC to engage in open debate about sensitive matters without
the worry of adverse public reaction to a position the FCC is not going to
take.
V. BENEFiTS OF NARROWiNG THE ACT
One of the problems with the Sunshine Act is that it was designed to
protect against an evil that does not appear to have existed at the time of
enactment. Proponents of the bill did not cite any evidence or examples in
which secrecy in administrative deliberations had given poor results, nor did
they argue that the officials in agencies were not trustworthy."' Instead,
they based their decision on the ideal that open government leads to more
trust from all.88 However, there were no laws enacted, nor are there any
now, which require the federal courts or the congressional committees to
82. Sommer, supra note 68, at 3.
83. Id.
84. Welbom et al., supra note 6, at 237.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 203.
88. Id.
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disclose their deliberations8 9 It is reasonable to argue that the Supreme
Court and Congress make decisions that are equally as important, if not
more important, than government agencies. By allowing predecisional
deliberations outside the public eye, agencies such as the FCC are afforded
at least some of the protection courts and legislatures are allowed in their
deliberations. If the public has the right to know what is happening in the
administrative agencies, why not the judicial and legislative branches as
well?
In addition, by allowing this limited exemption, the public will get
more informed decisions. The current Act is said to protect the public, but
the methods by which it institutes protection may actually harm the public
overall. The implementation of the Act addressed how government works
procedurally, not the substantive concerns of the average voter." The Act
has little effect on the average person. In fact, journalists and those who do
business with the FCC, are those most likely to take advantage of the
Act.91 This is evidenced in the discussion of whom it is that generally
brings suit against the FCC for violations of the Act.
The Act was not designed to allow for the public to gain information
through the press. However, in a guide to understanding the Act, agencies
conducting open meetings are not required to guarantee adequate accommo-
dations for everyone wishing to attend. "The purpose can be adequately
served if some members of the public are present, particularly if they
include representatives of the news media."' If the press is the primary
target audience for these meetings, the public gains its views through the
press. It is certainly true that information through the press can be
misleading and ultimately lead to a misunderstanding of the law and a
decline in the trust of the government.
What the public gains through this process is sometimes a distorted
view of the government. The public is left with short, scripted open
meetings, interpreted by the press. People are left with decisions that are not
well thought out because commissioners do not discuss them openly in a
collegial debate, and the public is sometimes left with a darker view of the
government than the Act ever intended. Therefore, by allowing the
exemption, nothing is necessarily lost in the way of public understanding.
89. Capital Markets Hearings, supra note 55.
90. Steven D. Stark, D.C. "s Illusory Changes, 17 NAT. L.L, July 3, 1995, at A21. Mr.
Stark argues that many of the current proposed changes in the GOP contract are guilty of
this also.
91. See Welbom et al., supra note 6, at 247.
92. RICHARD K. BERG & STEPHEN H. KLITZMAN, AN INTERPRETIVE GUIDE TO THE
GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT (1978).
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If commissioners explain their decisions in sufficient detail, the press is
likely to report more accurate information, therefore facilitating public
understanding.
Those who are concerned that the right of the public to know would
be compromised by a reform in the Act need only look to the relations
among the FCC commissioners. It is unlikely that the commissioners are
going to resort to secret compromised views outside of the public eye.
Terms are staggered in the FCC and it is often possible for commissioners
to be appointed who have differing political views and stances. Allowing
predecisional debate will foster the airing of these differences and allow all
of the commissioners to arrive at informed decisions.
CONCLUSION
The Sunshine Act, as a policy for open government, has significant
benefits. However, the broad appplication of the Act has created significant
costs to the decisionmaking processes of agencies. In order to effectively
allow for informed decisions, commissioners must be able to discuss ideas
in an open debate without the fear of appearing uncertain or uninformed. A
predecisional debate exemption would foster open debate among commis-
sioners. Let the sunshine in, but only where it is necessary, and where the
public actually gains some benefit from it.
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